Halsey Velling (swanskate5)

The project of justifying all the limits and failings of human cognition as inevitable consequences of strategies that are actually "optimal" relative to the limits on computational resources available may have some value, but it is far from a complete explanation. It is inconsistent with both common observation and a large body of experimentation, and it is of limited use in explaining human cognition.History can help refine the resource-rational model by uncovering how cultural and cognitive forces act together to shape decision-making. Specifically, history reveals how the meanings of key terms like "problem" and "solution" shift over time. Studying choices in their cultural contexts illuminates how changing perceptions of the decision-making process affect how choices are made on the ground.Lieder and Griffith's account of resource-rationality relies heavily on a notion of teleology. In this commentary, I criticize their teleocentric view as being incompatible with evolutionary theory, in which they aim to ground their analysis. As such, to save their view, I argue that they must jettison the notion of teleology, and their teleologically laden conclusions.We agree with the authors regarding the utility of viewing cognition as resulting from an optimal use of limited resources. Here, we advocate for extending this approach to the study of cognitive development, which we feel provides particularly powerful insight into the debate between bounded optimality and true sub-optimality, precisely because young children have limited computational and cognitive resources.We review evidence that the resource-rationality principle generalizes to human movement control. Optimization of the use of limited neurocomputational resources is described by the inclusion of the "neurocomputational cost" of sensory information processing and decision making in the optimality criterion of movement control. A resulting tendency to decrease this cost can account for various phenomena observed during goal-directed movements.We argue that Lieder and Griffiths' method for analyzing rational process models cannot capture an important constraint on resource allocation, which is competition between different processes for shared resources (Klein 2018, Biology and Philosophy3336). We suggest that holistic interactions between processes on at least three different timescales - episodic, developmental, and evolutionary - must be taken into account by a complete resource-bounded explanation.Leider and Griffiths clarify the basis for unification between mechanism-driven and solution-driven disciplines and methodologies in cognitive science. But, two outstanding issues arise for their model of resource-rationality human brains co-process information with their environments, rather than merely adapt to them; and this is expressed in methodological differences between disciplines that complicate Leider and Griffiths' proposed structural unification.Comprehensive accounts of resource-rational attempts to maximise utility shouldn't ignore the demands of constructing utility representations. This can be onerous when, as in humans, there are many rewarding modalities. Another thing best not ignored is the processing demands of making functional activity out of the many degrees of freedom of a body. The target article is almost silent on both.We evaluated the applicability of chitosan-g-oligo(L,L-lactide) copolymer (CLC) hydrogel for central nervous system (CNS) tissue engineering. The biomechanical properties of the CLC hydrogel were characterized and its biocompatibility was assessing with neural progenitor cells obtained from two different sources H9-derived neural stem cells (H9D-NSC) and directly reprogrammed neural precursor cells (drNPC). Our study found that the optically transparent CLC hydrogel possessed biomechanical characteristics suitable for culturing human neural stem/precursor cells and was non-cytotoxic. When plated on films prepared from CLC copo